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Abstract
The law of proportionate growth simply states that the time dependent change of a quan-
tity x is proportional to x. Its applicability to a wide range of dynamic phenomena is based
on various assumptions for the proportionality factor, which can be random or determin-
istic, constant or time dependent. Further, the dynamics can be combined with additional
additive growth terms, which can be constants, aggregated quantities, or interaction terms.
This allows to extent the core dynamics into an agent-based modeling framework with vast
applications in social and economic systems. The paper adopts this overarching perspec-
tive to discuss phenomena as diverse as saturated growth, competition, stochastic growth,
investments in random environments, wealth redistribution, opinion dynamics and the wis-
dom of crowds, reputation dynamics, knowledge growth, and the combination with network
dynamics.
1 Introduction
Stochastic systems and their application to economic dynamics have always been at the heart of
Masanao Aoki [3]. His aim was to reconstruct macroeconomic dynamic behaviour from of a large
collection of interacting agents [2], with a particular focus on the dynamics of firms. Already
early on, Aoki has combined such studies with decentralized optimization problems [1]. What
makes his work appealing to me is the clarity, the rigor and the accessibility of his modeling
approach. Linking economic behavior back to generalized stochastic dynamics allows to bridge
different scientific disciplines, including applied mathematics and statistical physics.
Such achievements made Aoki a forerunner in agent-based modeling, the way we want it to be:
Away from mere, and often arbitrary, computer simulations based on ad-hoc assumptions about
agent’s behavior, towards a formal, tractable and still insightful analysis of interacting systems.
Current trends in econophysics [4] and sociophysics [43] point into this direction.
In the spirit of Aoki’s approch, I will sketch how a class of multiplicative models can be fruitfully
applied to various dynamic problems in the socio-economic domain. The core of this model class
is the law of proportionate growth proposed by R. Gibrat in 1931 to describe the growth of firms.
The size of a firm is described by a (positive) variable xi(t). The law of proportionate growth then
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states that the growth of a firm, expressed by the time derivative x˙i(t), is proportional to xi(t).
But for the proportionality factor various assumptions can be made. In its original version, growth
rates have been proxied by random variables, so it is a stochastic model. It is also an agent-based
model because the dynamics focuses on individual firms. But, as in other agent-based models,
the aim is not to capture the growth of a particular firm in the most precise manner. Instead,
the research interest is in correctly reproducing the aggregated, or macro behavior of an ensemble
of firms.
It is interesting that, despite its simplicity, the law of proportionate growth is indeed able to
reproduce so-called stylized facts about the dynamics of firms. At the same time, it misses one
important modeling ingredient, namely interactions between agents. This sets the ground for the
following discussions. We will extend the basic model by introducing direct interactions, but also
indirect interactions via global couplings, for example redistribution mechanisms. These different
interaction terms are combined with different expressions for the growth term, which can become
also negative. Further, in addition to the multiplicative growth term, we consider an additive
term and, for these two terms, combine stochastic and deterministic dynamics in different ways.
With these assumptions, we obtain various agent-based models that all describe the dynamics
of agents, via xi(t). Eventually, we combine this dynamics for the agent variable with another
dynamics that changes the interaction structure of agents. This way, we arrive at a whole ensem-
ble of agent-based models, which all inherit from the same basic dynamics, namely proportional
growth, but additional model components allow to capture a plethora of socio-economic phe-
nomena.
2 Basic Dynamics: Multiplicative Growth
2.1 Exponential growth: Short time horizons
In the following, we consider a number of agents i = 1, ..., N , each of which is described by a
time dependent quantity xi(t). Thus, the system’s dynamics results from N concurring dynamic
processes. x is continuous and positive, i.e. xi(t) ≥ 0. The law of proportionate growth states
that the increase in time of xi(t) is proportional to the current value
dxi(t)
dt
= αixi(t) ; xi(t) = xi(0) exp{αit} (1)
It describes a self-reinforcing process which for the growth factor αi > 0 leads to exponential
growth and for αi < 0 to exponential decay of xi(t). Instead of a continuous time t, we can also
consider a discrete formulation t, t + ∆t, t + 2∆t, .... With ∆t = 1, the growth dynamics then
reads:
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) [1 + αi] (2)
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The exponential growth dynamics is shown in Figure 2(a).
Applications: Using this dynamics in a plain manner has the problem that, for long times,
the result becomes either unrealistic, because with αi > 0 the values of xi exceed any limit, or
it becomes uninteresting, because with αi < 0 the values of xi converge to zero. Nevertheless,
for intermediate times, we can still find exponential growth/decay in real systems. Exponential
growth has been observed in OTC derivatives market of the US [33], but also in the growth of
open source software platforms such as Sourceforge [50] (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Exponential growth in real systems: (a) Value of OTC derivatives of the Bank of
America [33], (b) Number of developers registered on the platform Sourceforge [50]
2.2 Relative growth: Competition
If we consider concurring processes, it is useful to introduce relative variables, or fractions,
yi(t) = xi(t)/
∑
i xi(t) for which a conservation holds:
∑
i yi(t) = 1. Let us further assume some
direct or indirect coupling that may affect the growth rate αi = αi(...., xi, xj , ...). For example,
the growth of quantity xi occurs via an interaction between agents i and j. Specificall it depends
on the relative advantage (ai − aj) of i over j and the respective quantity xj(t). If all agents are
allowed to interact, for the growth of i results:
αi(...., xi, xj , ...) =
∑
i
(ai − aj)xj (3)
For the growth dynamics of agent i we then find, in terms of the relative variable:
dyi(t)
dt
= yi(t) [ai − 〈a(t)〉] ; 〈a(t)〉 =
∑
i aixi(t)∑
i xi
=
∑
i
aiyi(t) (4)
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This selection equation, also known as Fisher-Eigen equation [12], states that, despite the xi(t)
of all agents grow exponentially, their share relative to the total population only grows as long
as their advantage (or fitness) ai is larger than the average fitness 〈a(t)〉. The latter, however,
increases over time because the xi(t) of agents with a fitness below average shrink. This way,
each agent i receives indirect information about its performance with respect to the average
performance. In the end, this competition dynamics leads to an outcome where only one agent
survives – the one with the highest advantage ai. This is illustrated in Fig. 2(b).
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Figure 2: (a) Exponential growth, Eqn. (1), and saturated growth, Eqn. (6). (b) Relative
growth, Eqn. (4). Parameters: ai (0.1; 0.125; 0.15; 0.175; 0.2), bi=0, saturated growth: bi=0.05.
Applications: The competition scenario described by Eqn. (4) holds if (i) a self-reinforcing
growth mechanism is involved, and (ii) a conservation law applies. This is quite common in
socio-economic systems, where e.g. products compete for customers via their cost price [12].
Also, market shares cannot grow independently because they are coupled to the market size [41].
The same dynamics can be also found for competing strategies in a game-theoretical setting [32]
or in cluster formation [51].
2.3 Size dependent growth factor: Saturation
Long-term exponential growth is a quite unrealistic scenario if limited resources are considered.
Therefore, for the growth factor αi usually some quantity dependent decrease is assumed. A very
common assumption is
αi(xi) = ai − bixi (5)
where bi is assumed to be small. In this case, we observe saturated growth (see also Fig. 2a)
dxi(t)
dt
= aixi − bix2i ; xi(t→∞) =
ai
bi
(6)
4/31
Frank Schweitzer:
The law of proportionate growth and its siblings:
Applications in agent-based modeling of socio-economic systems
(submitted for publication)
which is known as the logistic equation, originally proposed by P. Verhulst in 1838, rediscovered
by R. Pearl in 1920 and by A. Lotka in 1925.
Applications: In population dynamics many realistic growth processes are described by the
logistic equation, where the saturation reflects a limited carrying capacity. Surprisingly, also the
growth of donations empirically matches this dynamics [48]. Here, the limited resource is not
only the money available, but also the number of people willing to donate.
An important application of the dynamics of Eqn. (6) comes from its discretized version. Using
the transformation t→ n, zn = x(t) b/r with r = a+ 1, we arrive at the famous logistic map
zn+1 = r zn(1− zn) (7)
This is one of the paragons to study deterministic chaos, provided that 3.57 < r < 4.
2.4 Time dependent growth factor: Randomness
An important variant of the law of proportionate growth assumes random growth factors instead
of fixed ones, i.e αi → ηi(t), where ηi(t) is a random number draw from e.g. a normal distribution
with mean µη and variance σ2η:
ηi(t) ∼ N (µη, σ2η) (8)
Because of stochastic influences the most successful agent cannot be predicted from the outset,
as shown in Fig. 3(a). Instead, one finds that the quantity x follows a log-normal distribution
P (x, t) which changes over time as
P (x, t) =
1√
2piσ2ηt
1
x
exp
{
− [log(x)− µηt]
2
2σ2ηt
}
(9)
We note that this probability distribution does not reach a steady state. Its mean value and
variance increase over time as µx ∝ t, σ2x ∝ t. However, if µη < 0, for long times and sufficiently
large x the tail of the distribution can be approximated by a power law: P (x) ∝ x−|µη |.
Applications: Historically, this dynamics was first used by R. Gibrat in 1931 to describe the
growth of companies [56]. This has found mixed empirical evidence [4]. But other quantities that
can be approximately described by a time-dependent log-normal distribution, for instance the
wealth distribution, have been also modeled with this approach [60]. Eventually, also the growth
of cities has been described by the law of proportionate growth [29].
5/31
Frank Schweitzer:
The law of proportionate growth and its siblings:
Applications in agent-based modeling of socio-economic systems
(submitted for publication)
0 20 40 60 80 1000
5
10
t
x i
(a)
0 20 40 60 80 1000.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
t
x i
(b)
Figure 3: (a) Random growth, Eqn. (8), (b) Coupled random growth, Eqn. (10). Parameters:
N (µη, σ2η) with µη=0, σ2η=1.
2.5 Coupled random growth: Fraction dependent fluctuations
The dynamics x˙i(t) = ηi(t)xi(t) with a randomly drawn growth rate ηi assumes that agents
are subject to fluctuations in the same manner, regardless of their value xi(t). If xi denotes for
example the size of a firm, then it is empirically known that larger firms should be subject to
smaller fluctuations [4]. This can be considered by a size dependent variance, σ2(x) ∝ x−β ,
where β ≈ 0.2.
Focusing on the size only, however, completely ignores the market structure. Firms with a larger
market share, for instance, face a stronger competition, which should result in larger fluctuations.
One way of achieving this is a global coupling via
∑
i xi(t), for example:
dxi(t)
dt
= ηi(t)
xi(t)∑
i xi(t)
= ηi(t)yi(t) (10)
which is illustrated in Figure 3(b). Here, the growth is proportional to the relative influence of
agent i, i.e. to fraction obtained in the system. For sufficiently chosen µη, σ2η, the total quantity∑
i xi(t) may grow over time, which results in a smaller and smaller impact of the further growth
if the market share of i is small. I.e., in the course of time, for those agents we observe a
comparably stable value of yi(t). For agents with a large xi(t), and hence a large fraction yi(t),
we still observe remarkable fluctuations, although not comparable to those without a global
coupling, as shown in Figure 3(a).
In comparison to Eqn. (3), which already introduced such a global coupling between the different
growth processes, the existence of large fluctuations prevent the system from converging to an
equilibrium state where “the winner takes it all”. We note that both dynamics of Eqs. (4), (10)
belong to the class of so-called frequency dependent processes, where the dynamics depends on the
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relative share yi, determined either in a local neighborhood or globally. Examples of important
frequency-dependent processes are the (non-linear) voter model [44] and the Polya process.
Applications. This dynamics allows to combine two processes: (a) the indirect interaction
via an evolving mean value, which is the essence of a competition process, and (b) fluctuations
in the growth process that depend on the relative influence, or the ranking, of the agent. This
combination prevents the system from converging to an uninteresting equilibrium state, but still
considers the “comparative advantage” of agents.
3 Multiplicative and additive growth
3.1 Lossy multiplicative growth: Geometric versus arithmetic mean
The outcome of a discrete dynamics of the type
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t)[1 + ηi(t)] = λi(t)xi(t) (11)
very much depends on the parameters of the distribution N (µλ, σ2λ) of the randomly drawn
growth rates λi. We can express these parameters as follows:
µλ = 〈λ〉 ; σ2λ =
〈
λ2
〉− 〈λ〉2 (12)
Equation (11) can be rewritten as
log xi(t+ 1) = log λi(t) + log xi(t) =
t∑
s=0
log λi(s) (13)
with the parameters for the distribution of the random variable (log λ):
µlog λ = 〈log λ〉 ; σ2log λ =
〈
log λ2
〉− 〈log λ〉2 (14)
Applying the central limit theorem to Eqn. (13) implies that the distribution of the random
variable x(t) over time gets closer to a log-normal distribution, Eqn. (9) or, equivalently, the
random variable log x(t) gets closer to a normal distribution with the parameters
µlog x(t) = t µlog λ ; σ
2
log x(t) = t σ
2
log λ. (15)
This means that the expected value, i.e. the maximum of the probability distribution, still grows
in time. On the other hand, one can show [27] that individual growth trajectories xi disappear
if
µlog λ < 0 < logµλ ⇒ 〈λ〉geo = exp(µlog λ) < 1 < µλ = 〈λ〉 (16)
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where 〈λ〉geo denotes the geometrical mean, which has to be smaller than the arithmetic mean 〈λ〉.
The fact that xi(t)→ 0 is remarkable because it is also counter intuitive. So, there is a need to also
use agent-based modeling in addition to an analysis of aggregated measures, such as distributions,
because it allows us to better understand what happens on the microscopic/individual level.
Applications. The above insights can be directly applied to multiplicative growth processes
with random time-dependent growth factors discussed already in Sect. 2.4. Hence, they help
to better understand under which conditions a decline in firm sizes, city sizes, or individual
wealth [55] can be expected if the underlying stochastic dynamics holds. The same dynamics was
also applied to model the growth, more precisely the decline, of individual human capital which
follows a life cycle over time [18].
3.2 Constant additive growth: Stationarity
To avoid a scenario where individual growth trajectories disappear, one can add a term ωi to the
dynamics:
xi(t+ 1) = λi(t)xi(t) + ωi(t) (17)
ωi(t) can have different forms as discussed below: it can be a small positive constant, ωi(t) ≡
A > 0, it can be a time dependent function that further depend on the state of other agents, or
it can be fluctuating, like an additive noise term.
The mere existence of such an additive term changes the properties of the underlying dynamics.
For ωi = A, we find a stationary distribution:
P s(x) =
(A/σ2λ)
µλ
Γ(µλ)
x−(1−µλ) exp
{
− A
σ2λx
}
(18)
where Γ(x) is the Gamma function. This distribution is plotted in Figure 4. The most probable
value, i.e. the maximum of the distribution, is given by xmp ≈ A/ 〈λ2〉.
We note that Eqs.(17), (18) are special cases of a more general framework for multiplicative
processes [39]
∆x(t) = η(t)G[x(t)] + F [x(t)] (19)
with the general (non-normalized) solution
P s(x) =
1
G2(x)
exp
{
2
D
∫ x F (x′)
G2(x′)
dx′
}
(20)
Our case is covered by G(x) = x and F (x) = A.
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Figure 4: (a) Stationary distribution P s(x), Eqn. (18) (dashed line), agent-based simulations,
Eqn. (17) (dots) [34], (b) Detecting an optimal investment qi(t) in a noisy market by means of
a genetic algorithm [35].
Applications. This dynamics is frequently used to model stock market behavior [39] or invest-
ments in random environments, in general [34, 35]. The stochasticity can come from fluctuating
yields, e.g. ηi(t) = r(t)qi(t), where 0 ≤ qi(t) ≤ 1 is the wealth fraction that agent i decides to
invest in a volatile market and r(t) is the return on investment, i.e. the random variable. r(t)
is independent of the agents and describes the market dynamics, with a lower bound of −1,
i.e. full loss of the investment, but no upper bound. Investment decisions are then modeled by
forecasting the best value qi(t) given some information about previous values of r(t) from time
series data. Here, machine learning algorithms can be used to determine the dynamics for qi(t),
as demonstrated in Figure 4(b).
3.3 Variable additive growth: Redistribution
Instead of a fixed (small) amount added to the individual growth dynamics, one can also consider
a changing amount that depends on the overall growth. Let us assume that xi(t) denotes the
individual wealth of agent i, which is taxed by a a central authority (the government) at a fixed
tax rate a, known as proportional tax scenario.
From the total amount of taxes, T (t) = a
∑
i xi(t), the government withholds a fraction b to
cover the costs for its administration, and redistributes the remaining fraction (1− b) equally to
all N agents as a subsidy [27]. The wealth of each agent still evolves independently according to
the stochastic growth dynamics of Eqn. (14). Together with the taxation and the subsidy, the
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total wealth of an agent at time t+ 1 is therefore given as:
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) [λi(t)− a] + a[1− b]
N
∑
i
xi(t) (21)
Let us now assume that the conditions of Eqn. (16) hold, i.e. that due to the stochastic dynamics
alone the individual wealth will disappear over time. This is realized by choosing 〈λ〉geo = 2/3 <
1 < 3/2 = 〈λ〉. The larger the spread of these two values, the larger the “risk” associated with
the “production of wealth”. The question then is: under which conditions could the proposed
redistribution mechanism prevent the decay of wealth? Could it even lead to an increase, instead
of a decrease, of individual wealth over time?
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Figure 5: (a) Sample trajectories of the total wealth
∑
i xi(t) (y-axis, in log scale) over time
t (x-axis, in normal scale) for three different parameter settings a, b, N . Tax schemes: (blue)
proportional tax, (red) progressive tax (no tax if wealth is below a threshold), (green) regressive
tax (fixed tax for everyone), see [27] for details. (b) Solid lines divide zones of wealth growth (to
the left) and wealth destruction (to the right). Dashed lines aopt(b) are optimal tax rates for a
given administration cost, which maximize the growth of total wealth. Above the black dotted
line only wealth destruction can happen.
The answer is yes, and the simplicity of the agent-based model allows to study these conditions
in a simulation approach. Figure 5(a) shows sample trajectories of the total wealth
∑
i xi(t) for
varying parameters a, b, N . The colors refer to three different taxation schemes (see [27] for
details), the blue curve holds for proportional tax. The straight black lines show two limit cases:
10/31
Frank Schweitzer:
The law of proportionate growth and its siblings:
Applications in agent-based modeling of socio-economic systems
(submitted for publication)
The lower line is for “no tax”, where the individual wealth evolves in time proportional to [〈λ〉geo]t,
i.e. it decays exponentially. The upper line is for “full tax”, where the individual wealth evolves
over time proportional to [(1 − ba) 〈λ〉]t, i.e. it increases exponentially. Realistic redistribution
scenarios have to be between these two limit cases and further depend on the size of the agent
population, N . The larger the population, the better the redistribution effect. Obviously, the
value of the tax rates, a, is not to be chosen independently of the value of the administration
cost, b. Figure 5(b) shows, for fixed values of N and 〈λ〉, 〈λ〉geo, the range of parameters which
could possibly lead to an increase of total wealth.
Applications. The redistribution model allows to study the impact of different tax scenarios
on the wealth of a population. As shown in Figure 5, two other realistic scenarios of tax col-
lection, progressive tax and regressive tax, have been discussed in [27]. Further, the impact of
different redistribution mechanisms can be studied and additional economic constraints, such as
conservation of money, can be included.
From a more general perspective this redistribution model has much in common with other mod-
els studying the portfolio effect in investment science [30, 54]. The positive impact of rebalancing
gains and losses, first discussed by JL Kelly in 1956, is rediscovered from time to time in different
contexts [59].
4 Multiplicative decay and additive growth
4.1 Additive stochastic influences: Brownian agents
So far, we assumed that the proportional growth term αixi(t) has a positive growth rate αi at
least on average. Otherwise, instead of growth, we can only observe an exponential decay of xi
over time, which needs to be compensated by additional additive terms. There is a whole class
of dynamic processes where αi is always negative. For example, the motion of a particle under
friction is described by a friction coefficient αi ≡ −γ. For the case of Brownian particles, the
equation of motion proposed by Langevin posits that this friction is compensated by an additive
stochastic force, to keep the particle moving:
dv(t)
dt
= −γ v(t) +
√
2S ξ(t) ; 〈ξ(t)〉 = 0 ; 〈ξ(t′)ξ(t)〉 = δ(t′ − t) (22)
S denotes the strength of the stochastic force and is, in physics, determined by the fluctuation-
dissipation theorem. ξ(t) is Gaussian white noise, i.e. it has the expectation value of zero and only
delta-correlations in time. v(t) denotes the continuous velocity of the Brownian particle, which
can be positive or negative. The positive quantity xi(t) = |vi(t)| then has the physical meaning
of a speed and follows the same equation.
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We assume that the agent dynamics is described by a set of stochastic equations which resemble
the Langevin equation of Browian motion, therefore the notion of Brownian agents has been
established [42]. For our further consideration in an agent-based model, the structure of Eqn. (22)
is important. The agent dynamics results from a superposition of two different types of influences,
deterministic and stochastic ones. In Eqn. (17), the first term λi(t)xi(t) is the stochastic term,
while the second term ωi(t) is the deterministic term. In Eqn. (22), on the other hand, the first
term denotes deterministic forces. This is, in the most simple case of Eqn. (22), the relaxation
term which defines a temporal scale of the agent dynamics. The second term denotes stochastic
forces which summarize all influences that are not specified on these temporal or spatial scales.
To develop Eqn. (22) into the dynamics of a Brownian agent, this picture still misses interactions
between agents. These can be represented by additional additive terms:
dxi(t)
dt
= −γ xi(t) + G(x,w,u) +Diξi(t) (23)
The function G(x,w,u) fulfills several purposes. First, with x as the vector of all variables xi(t),
it describes interactions between agents via couplings between xi(t) and any xj(t). Second, G is,
in general, a nonlinear function of xi itself,
∑n
k=0 βk(w,u) x
k
i (t) [43], which allows to consider
dynamic feedback processes such as self-reinforced growth. Third, the coefficients βk(w,u) of
such a non-linear function can consider additional couplings to other variables wi(t) of the agents,
which are summarized in the vector w. u eventually represents a set of control parameters to
capture e.g. the influence of the environment. Di defines the individual susceptibility of agent i
to stochastic influences.
Applications. The concept of Brownian agents [42] has found a vast range of applications
at different levels of organization, physical, biological and social. Specifically, active motion and
clustering in biological systems [10, 11, 17, 51], self-wiring of networks and trail formation based
on chemotactic interactions [21, 47, 52] and emotional influence in online communications [13–
15, 46, 57] are studied both from a modeling and a data-driven perspective.
An important application for the additional coupling between agent variables is to consider the
variable wi(t) as the internal energy depot of an agent. It allows for different activities that
go beyond the level defined by the fluctuation-dissipation theorem. This has resulted into an
unifying agent-based framework to model active matter [43]. As other types of self-organizing
systems, active matter [6] relies on the take-up of energy that can be used for example for ac-
tive motion or structure formation. Our theoretical description is based on the coupling between
driving variables, wi(t), to describe the take-up, storage and conversion of energy, and driven
variables, xi(t), to describe the energy consuming activities. Modified Langevin equations re-
flect the stochastic dynamics of both types of variables. System-specific hypotheses about their
coupling can be encoded in additional non-linear functions.
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4.2 Wisdom of crowds: Response to aggregated information
The additive stochastic dynamics discussed above can be used to model the opinion dynamics of
agents. Here, xi(t) denotes the continuous opinion of agent i. Let us consider the so-called wisdom
of crowd (WoC) effect, where the values of x are usually mapped to the positive space, x ≥ 0.
Agents are given a particular question with a definite answer, unknown to them, for example:
“What is the length of the border of Switzerland?” [28]. Their opinion xi > 0 then denotes their
individual estimates about this length. The WoC effect states that if one takes N independent
estimates, the average 〈x〉 = (1/N)∑i xi is close to the true value xT . I.e., the WoC effect is a
purely statistical phenomenon, where the “wisdom” is on the population level. It only works if
the distribution of estimates P (x) is sufficiently broad, i.e. the variance, or the group diversity of
opinions, should be high.
In case of social influence, e.g. information exchange between agents, estimates are no longer
independent and the variance can reduce considerably. One can argue that social influence could
help agents to converge to a mean value closer to the truth. On the other hand, social influence
could also help agents to converge to a mean value much further away from the truth – without
recognizing it. That means, agents can collectively convince each other about the wrong opinion
to be the right one.
Because this is a real-world problem for all social decision processes, it has been studied both
experimentally [28, 32, 38] and theoretically [31]. In a controlled experiment, agents are given
the same question a number of times. They form an independent initial estimate xi(0). After
each subsequent time step, agents are given additional information about the estimates of other
agents, which allows them to correct their own estimate, i.e. xi(t) becomes a function of time.
This can be described by the dynamics:
dxi(t)
dt
= γ [xi(0)− xi(t)] +
∑
j
F(xj , xi) +Dξi(t) (24)
which is a modification of Eqn. (23). The relaxation term −γxi is now corrected by the initial
estimate. That means, without any social influence xi(t) has the tendency to converge to xi(0),
rather than to zero. γ is the strength of an agent’s individual conviction. Thus, the first term
describes the tendency of an agent to stick to the original opinion.
F(xj , xi) describes the interaction between agents, specifically between their opinions. In a con-
trolled experiment [28] agents can for example at each time step get information about the
estimates xj(t) of all other agents (full information regime), or only information about the av-
erage estimate 〈x(t)〉 (aggregated information regime). These regimes are expressed in different
forms of F . A general ansatz reads:
F(xj , xi) = [xj(t)− xi(t)]wij (25)
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Different forms of wij encode how much weight agent i attributes to the opinion of agent j. For
the aggregated information regime, the quantity wij is a constant, wij = α/N , where α denotes
the strength of the social influence. With this, we can rewrite the dynamics of Eqn. (24) as:
dxi(t)
dt
= γ [xi(0)− xi(t)] + α [〈x(t)〉 − xi(t)] +Dξi(t) (26)
= −γ′xi(t) + α 〈x(t)〉+ γxi(0) +Dξi(t)
with γ′ = γ + α. Eqn. (26) highlights the coupling to the “mean field” formed by all agents,
because all agents interact and have the same wij . The stochastic equation for the mean opinion
[31]:
d 〈x(t)〉
dt
= γ [〈x(0)〉 − 〈x(t)〉] + D√
N
〈ξ(t)〉 (27)
describes a so-called Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process and has an analytic solution.
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Figure 6: WoC effect for a parameter sweep of individual conviction γ and social influence α.
Different initial conditions: (a) lnxT < 〈lnx(0)〉, (b) lnxT > 〈lnx(0)〉. The color code indicates
how close the wisdom of crowds approaches the known truth: 50 (red) is the best performance.
[31]
To better understand the role of the two model parameters, individual conviction γ and social
influence α, one can run agent-based simulations with the dynamics of Eqn. (26) [31]. Figure 6
shows how well the wisdom of crowds performs in reaching the (known) truth xT , dependent
on the initial conditions, xi(0). Figure 6(a) illustrates a starting configuration, where lnxT <
〈lnx(0)〉. In this case, a larger social influence always leads to a worse performance of the
WoC (indicated by the monotonous color change from red to blue). Figure 6(b), on the other
hand, illustrates a starting configuration, where lnxT > 〈lnx(0)〉. Here we find instead a non-
monotonous color change. While for very small values of the social influence the performance is
lower (yellow), it increases for medium values of α (red), before it declines again for large values
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of α (blue). Hence, in a region A increasing social influence can help the wisdom of crowds, while
in a region B increasing social influence rather distorts the WoC effect.
Applications. It is quite remarkable how well the agent-based dynamics of Eqn. (26) de-
scribes the empirical results for the aggregated information regime [32] obtained in controlled
experiments with humans [28]. It was found that the adjustment of individual opinions depends
linearly on the distance to the mean of all estimates, even though the correct answers for different
questions differ by several orders of magnitude.
4.3 Bounded confidence: Consensus versus coexistence of opinions
The redistribution model and the WoC model both assume that agents in a population interact
via an aggregated variable. This is different in the so-called “bounded confidence” model [26].
Here, the continuous values of x represent opinions which are mapped to the positive space,
x ≥ 0, and transformed to the unit interval [0, 1]. The model assumes that two randomly chosen
agents i and j can interact only if they are sufficiently close in their values xi(t), precisely if
|xi(t)− xj(t)| < ε, i.e. below a given threshold ε, which defines a tolerance for other’s opinions.
Thanks for their interaction, agents adjust their opinions towards each other, which is motivated
by social arguments:
dxi(t)
dt
= γ [xj(t)− xi(t)] Θ[zij(t)] ; zij(t) = ε− |xj(t)− xi(t)| (28)
Here, Θ[z] is the Heaviside function, which returns Θ[z] = 1 if z ≥ 0 and Θ[z] = 0 otherwise. The
parameter 0 < γ ≤ 0.5 basically defines the time scale at which the opinions of the two agents
converge, provided that zij(t) ≥ 0. If γ = 0.5, both agents immediately adjust their xi(t), xj(t)
towards the common mean.
Because at each time step only two randomly chosen agents can interact, the sequence of in-
teractions matters for the final outcome and the collective opinion dynamics becomes a path
dependent process. The main research question addressed with this type of model is about con-
sensus formation, i.e. about the conditions under which a population of agents with randomly
chosen initial opinions xi(0) ∈ [0, 1] converges to one final opinion. While γ only determines
the time scale for convergence, the threshold ε mainly decides about the outcome. Fig. 7 shows
examples for two different values of ε. For ε = 0.5, we indeed find consensus, while for ε = 0.1
we observe the coexistence of two final opinons. It was shown [9] that convergence towards con-
sensus can be expected for ε ≥ 0.25. If the interaction threshold is below this critical value,
we observe instead the convergence towards multiple stationary opinions. This reminds on the
period doubling scenario, i.e. the multiplicity of solutions found for the logistic map, Eqn. (7),
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Figure 7: Bounded confidence dynamics, Eqn. (28) for γ=0.5 and different threshold values: (a)
ε=0.5, (b) ε=0.1
when varying the control parameter r. Similar to that example, in the bounded confidence model
we also observe “windows” in which convergence to one stationary value is observed.
Instead of a sequence of dyadic interactions of agents, one can also consider group interactions,
in which many agents interact simultaneously. The dynamics then changes into:
dxi(t)
dt
=
γ
Ni(ε, t)
∑
j
[xj(t)− xi(t)] Θ[zij(t)] ; Ni(ε, t) =
∑
j
Θ[zij(t)] (29)
where the normalization Ni depends on all agent’s opinions and therefore on time, but also on
the threshold ε. For ε → 1, Ni(ε, t) → N , and we obtain again an agent dynamics which is
coupled to the mean, with γ′ = γ/N :
dxi(t)
dt
= −γ′xi(t) + γ′ 〈x(t)〉 (30)
Applications. Most applications of the bounded confidence model propose ways to enhance
consensus formation, for instance by introducing asymmetric confidence values εleft, εright [20].
Consensus can be also fostered using a hierarchical opinion dynamics [36, 37] as shown in Fig-
ure 8(a). During a first time period, all agents adjust their opinions according to the bounded
confidence model, Eqn. (28), such that groups with distinct opinions are formed. During a second
period, these group opinions are represented by delegates that follow the same dynamics, but
have a larger threshold than “normal” agents, ε2 > ε1. Therefore, these delegates are likely to
find a consensus even in cases where the original agent population fails to converge to a joint
opinion.
Another application of the bounded confidence model explains the emergence of so-called local
cultures, a commonly shared behavior within a cluster of firms [19]. The basic assumption is that
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Figure 8: (a) Hierarchical opinion dynamics with ε1 = 0.1, ε2 = 1. Additionally in the dynam-
ics an asymmetric preference for opinions closer to zero is assumed [37]. (b) Opinion dynamics
with in-group influence, Eqs. (31), (32), with ε=0.3. Green links indicate that agents would not
interact without the influence of their in-groups [19].
agents keep partnership relations from past interactions and this way form so-called in-groups
Ii(t). The opinions of agents from the in-group continue to influence an agent’s opinion, this way
leading to an effective opinion
xeffi (t) = [1− αi(t)]xi(t) + αi(t) 〈x〉Ii (t) (31)
Here 〈x〉Ii (t) is the mean opinion of agents in the in-group of i, and αi(t) weights this influence
against the “native” opinion xi(t) of agent i, considering the size of the in-group, |Ii(t)|:
〈x〉Ii (t) =
1
|Ii(t)|
∑
j∈Ii(t)
xj(t) ; αi(t) =
|Ii(t)|
|Ii(t)|+ 1 (32)
While agents adjust their opinions xi(t) according to the bounded confidence model, Eqn. (28),
their effective opinions xeffi (t) decide about their interactions, i.e. zij(t) = ε −
∣∣∣xeffj (t)− xeffi (t)∣∣∣
Only if interaction takes place, i.e. zij(t) ≥ 0, j is added to the in-group of i and a link between
agents i and j is formed. Because a change of 〈x〉Ii (t) can occur even if i does not interact, this
impacts xeffi (t) continuously. So, two agents i and j randomly chosen at different times may form
a link later, or may remove an existing link because of their in-groups’ influence, as illustrated
in Figure 8(b). This feedback between agents’ opinions and their in-group structure sometimes
allows to obtain consensus, or a common “local culture”, even in cases where the original dynamics
would fail.
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4.4 Bilateral encounters: Reputation growth from battling
In opinion dynamics, the variable xi(t) does not assume any intrinsic value, i.e. it is not favorable
to have a larger or smaller xi(t). This changes if we consider that xi(t) represents the reputation
of agent i, where “higher” means “better”. Reputation, in loose terms, summarizes the “status”
of an agent, as perceived by others. It can be seen as a social capital and influences for example
the choice of interaction partners. For firms, reputation is an intangible asset, that means, it
is difficult to quantify, but at the same time influences the decisions of investors or customers
[61]. Even if the measurement of reputation is a problem, it is obvious that reputation has to be
maintained, otherwise it fades out. This can be captured by the dynamics already discussed:
dxi(t)
dt
= −γxi(t) +
∑
j
F(xj , xi) (33)
The multiplicative term describes the exponential decay of reputation over time. To compensate
for this requires a continuous effort, expressed in the interaction term F(xj , xi). This assumes
that reputation can be (only) built up in interactions with other agents j. One could include
into the dynamics of Eqn. (33) another source term for reputation which solely depends on the
efforts of agent i, but its justification remains problematic. One could argue that, for example, the
reputation of scientists depends on their effort writing publications. But this individual effort can
hardly be quantified and compared across scientists. More importantly, not the effort matters for
the reputation, but the attention the publication receives from other scientists [40], as quantified
e.g. by the number of citations. Eqn. (33) is similar to the general dynamics proposed in Eqn. (24),
just that no additive stochastic influence is explicitly considered here and no intrinsic reputation
xi(0) is assumed. For the interaction term, we can in the following separately discuss two different
limit cases: (i) Reputation is obtained solely during direct battles between two agents, where the
winner gains in reputation and the looser not. (ii) Reputation is obtained solely from interacting
with other agents and increases with their reputation.
In case of individual battles, we assume that during each time step each agent i has a bilateral
interaction with any other agent j. For the interaction term we propose [45]:
F(xj , xi) = 1
N
∑
j
ρ(xi, xj)
{
g + h∆ji Θ [∆ji]
}
; ∆ji = xj(t)− xi(t) (34)
ρ(xi, xj) is a function that decides which agent will be the winner in an interaction between any
two agents i and j. It depends on the reputation of both agents, but additionally also considers
random influences [45]. The expression in curly brackets determines the reputation gain for the
winner. It consists of two contributions. g is a constant reward for every winner. It accounts for
the fact that engaging in such fights is a costly action that should be compensated. h∆ji is a
bonus reward that applies only if agent i was the one with the lower reputation, xi < xj , and
still won the fight. This is expressed by the Heavyside function Θ[∆ji]. Note that, in this model,
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only the reputation of the winning agent will be changed, the loosing agent does not additionally
loose in reputation.
0 5 10 15 200
2
4
6
8
10
t
x i
(a)
0 5 10 15 200
2
4
6
8
10
t
x i
(b)
Figure 9: Reputation dynamics from bilateral encounters, Eqs. (33), (34). Variance of the
normal distribution, from which random influences are drawn: (a) σ2=1.4, (b) σ2=1.2 [45].
Applications. Fights between individuals are ubiquitous in the animal kingdom to establish
reputation. In a biological setting, reputation differences translate into dominance relations.
Hence, this model has a particular relevance to explain social hierarchies in animal societies
[7]. It allows to test whether hierarchies in social organizations are an emerging phenomenon or
whether they result from the reinforcement of intrinsic advantages of individuals. Subsequently,
an interaction model allows to test different feedback mechanisms. If the winner is rewarded and
the looser is punished, this results in a double reinforcement, and the model displays a strong
lock-in effect. That is, the outcome is almost entirely determined by the first few interactions,
initial random differences are just amplified. To obtain realistic hierarchies, it is sufficient to
only reward the winner [45]. For hierarchies with different levels the mentioned function ρ(xi, xj)
plays a particular role. It reflects random influences, the magnitude of which is expressed by the
variance σ2 of a normal distribution. For large values of σ2 egalitarian regimes are obtained, for
intermediate values one agent dominates (despotic hierarchy), as shown in Figure 9(a), while for
small values layered hierarchies can be obtained as shown in Figure 9(b)
4.5 Network interactions: Reputation growth through feedback cycles
The second limit case, where reputation is obtained solely from interacting with other agents,
can be expressed by the following interaction term:
F(xj , xi) =
∑
j
lji xj(t) (35)
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The coefficients lji are unweighted, but directed links between agents j and i. lji(t) = 1 if there
is a link from j to i, i.e. agent j can boost the reputation of i proportional to its own reputation.
This is a very common feedback mechanism, also used to define eigenvector centrality [8], with
many applications. For example, in an online social network (OSN) like Twitter, a link j → i
indicates that j is a follower of i, and the prominence of j impacts the prominence of i. lji(t) = 0
if no directed link exists, and lii(t) = 0 because an agent cannot boost its own reputation.
With these considerations, the multi-agent system can be represented as a complex network,
G(E, V ) (graph), where nodes, V (vertices), represent agents and directed links, E (edges),
between nodes their directed interactions. The network structure is then encoded in an adjacency
matrix A with matrix entries lji. Using the interaction term, Eqn. (35), the stationary solution
for the dynamics of Eqn. (33) can be formally written as:
xstati =
1
γ
∑
j
ljix
stat
j (36)
This defines a set of coupled equations and has the structure of an eigenvalue problem. It has
a stationary solution only if the factor γ is the eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix A. That
means, for arbitrarily chosen values of γ different from an eigenvalue, the xi(t) will either grow
too fast (small γ) or too slow (large γ) to be balanced by the other xj(t), this way resulting in a
non-stationary solution. For a stationary solution, usually the largest eigenvalue is taken because
it guarantees that all solutions are positive (if the matrix A is non-negative).
One can eliminate γ by transforming the absolute reputation values xi(t) into relative reputa-
tions, yi(t) = xi(t)/
∑
j xj(t). This also has a practical implication: absolute values are hard to
know and, to compare agents, relative values are sufficient. Under most practical circumstances,
however, one would also not be able to obtain a complete normalization,
∑
j xj(t). But it is
sufficient [49] if we can normalize by the largest reputation: yi(t) = xi(t)/xmaxz (t).
dyi
dt
=
∑
j
lji yj(t)− yi(t)
∑
j
ljz yj(t) (37)
where z is the index of the agent with highest absolute reputation xmaxz (t) at time t, which is for
instance often known in a OSN. Its scaling impact on the relative reputation is summarized in the
second term of Eqn. (37). This represents the reputation decay for agent i with a strength equal to
the total boost in reputation that agent z receives. One can show [49] that an equilibrium solution
for xi(t), Eqs. (33), (35), is also an equilibrium solution for yi(t) (with either normalization) up to
a scaling factor. Specifically, for an eigenvector yλ of the adjacency matrix A, the corresponding
eigenvalue λ is given by:
∑
j ljz yi = λ.
Whether non-trivial solutions for the stationary reputation values, xi(t)→ xstati , exist, strongly
depends on the adjacency matrix, as illustrated in Figure 10. Specifically, if an agent has no
incoming links that boosts its reputation, xi(t) will go to zero. Therefore, even if this agent has
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an outgoing link to other agents j, it cannot boost their reputation. Non-trivial solutions depend
on the existence of cycles which are formally defined as subgraphs in which there is a closed
path from every node in the subgraph back to itself. The shortest possible cycle involves two
agents, 1 → 2 → 1. This maps to direct reciprocity : agent 1 boosts the reputation of agent 2,
and vice versa. Cycles of length 3 map to indirect reciprocity, for example 1 → 2 → 3 → 1. In
this case, there is no direct reciprocity between any two agents, but all of them benefit regarding
their reputation because they are part of the cycle. In order to obtain a non-trivial reputation,
an agent not necessarily has to be part of a cycle, but it has to be connected to a cycle.
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Figure 10: Impact of the adjacency matrix on the reputation xi(t) of three agents. Only if cycles
exist and agents are connected to these cycles, a non-trivial stationary reputation can be obtained.
The chosen γ = 1 is indeed an eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix in (a) and (c). This is not the
case for (b), hence we do not observe a stationary solution, just a convergence to zero.
Applications. The type of feedback dynamics discussed above is widely used to characterize
the importance of nodes in a network. Already Google’s early version of the PageRank algorithm
built on this. A related measure, DebtRank was introduced to quantify the importance of insti-
tutions in a financial network [5]. Further, the approach has found an important application to
model online social networks (OSN) [49]. For example in Twitter or Instagram, the reputation
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of users is not just determined by the number of followers, but also by their reputation. It makes
all the difference, whether individual i is a follower of the famous actor z, or the other way round.
Social networks are often characterized by a core-periphery structure, where the core contains a
subset of well connected users. This is important for the application of this model, as it relies
on the existence of cycles. These cycles can be of any length, even structures of interlocking
cycles can be present. Their existence, as reflected in the adjacency matrix, then impacts the
corresponding eigenvalues and hence the (relative) reputation of users. It is computationally
hard to detect such interlocking cycle structures in real social networks. In a case study of 40
million Twitter users, reputation was therefore measures by means of a D-core decomposition
[16].
5 Growth combined with network dynamics
5.1 Nonlinear growth of knowledge stock: Entry and exit dynamics
Not only reputation depends on the feedback from other agents, also knowledge growth crucially
relies on it. Let us assume that the quantity xi(t) now describes the knowledge stock of agent i,
for example the R&D (research and development) experience of a firm, measurable by its number
of patents and research alliances.
The value of knowledge continuously decreases if it is not maintained. Hence, we can propose the
same general Eqn. (33) for reputation to also describe the dynamics of the knowledge stock. To
compensate for the decay, we assume that the growth of knowledge is mainly driven by input from
other agents, i.e. by R&D collaborations, rather than by own activities. This reflects empirical
observations for innovation networks of firms [58].
Different from reputation growth, for which no upper limit needs to be assumed, it is reasonable
to consider a saturation for the growth of knowledge stock, similar to the quadratic term used
in the saturated growth Eqn. (6). At higher levels of knowledge stock, it becomes more difficult
to “absorb” new knowledge, i.e. to incorporate it into a firm, simply because of the internal
complexity associated with the way knowledge is stored and linked internally. Because of this
absorptive capacity, and we propose the following dynamics for the knowledge stock [25]:
dxi(t)
dt
= −γ xi(t) + ν
∑
j
lji xj(t) + ν
ext
∑
j
pji xj(t)− κ
∑
j
lij x
2
i (t) (38)
The knowledge growth is mainly determined by the knowledge stock of agents j that have direct
link to agent i, as expressed by the lji. But we can additionally consider that some links, denoted
by pji, provide direct input to i from particular valuable agents. For example, instead of obtaining
indirect knowledge input from an agent k via other agents j, agent i would much more benefit
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if k had a direct link to i. So, if pji = 1, in addition to the usual benefit ν there will be an
extra benefit νext from interacting with this valuable agent. As we have already noticed the
importance of indirect reciprocity in the growth of xi, such extra benefit could also arise from
links that contribute to closing cycles in the interaction network. This would allow feedback
cycles for instance in the development of a technology.
With or without the additional saturation and growth terms, under certain conditions for the
parameters Eqn. (38) will lead to a stationary solution for the knowledge stock of all agents, as
discussed in Sect. 4.5. An evaluation of the stationary solutions of Eqn. (38) that corresponds
to Figure 10 can be found in [25]. To make the dynamics of the system more realistic, we can
further consider an entry and exit dynamics. Not successful agents may leave the system, whereas
new agents enter. This is associated with rewiring the network that represents the collaboration
interactions, i.e. some links are removed and others are newly formed.
As an implication, the dynamics is then described by two different time scales: there is a dynamics
on the network at time scale t, and a dynamics of the network at time scale T , and we assume
that they can be separated. On the shorter time scale, t, agents interact and in conclusion obtain
a stationary value of their knowledge stock, xstati . On the longer time scale, T , the entry and exit
dynamics takes place, specifically after the stationary solution for xi(t) was reached. That means,
the interaction structure given by the network evolves on time scale T , whereas the knowledge
stock of agents evolves on time scale t.
At each time step T a different (quasi-)stationary value xstati (T ) is obtained. This can be used
to distinguish between successful and not successful agents, i.e. to measure performance. We can
rank agents against their obtained stationary knowledge stock, xstati (T ) taken at time T , before
the network is changed. As already explained in Figure 10, agents without incoming links will
likely have a knowledge stock of zero, as well as agents that are not part of a cycle of direct or
indirect reciprocity. Only agents that are part of collaboration cycles will reach a high value of
xstati (T ). That means, agents well integrated into collaborations are clearly distinguishable from
less integrated ones.
Applications. There are different ways to apply the above combination of nonlinear growth
and entry and exit dynamics. Using economic arguments, different nonlinear expressions can be
motivated [25], in particular with respect to externalities, νext, and saturation effects. The impact
of these assumptions on the resulting knowledge stock distribution can then be evaluated.
More important is the study of different entry and exit dynamics. Its simplest form is a so-
called extremal dynamics: from the least performing agents with the lowest knowledge stock
one is randomly chosen and removed from the system together with all its collaboration links.
This agent is then replaced by a new agent, which is randomly connected to the remaining
agents. Because of the large degree of randomness involved, this type of entry and exit dynamics
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would describe a network disruption based on perturbations rather than an economic process.
Nevertheless, the dynamic outcome is quite insightful. Figure 11(a) illustrates that the overall
performance of the system, measured by means of an average knowledge stock, follows different
stages: Initially, it is very low because collaboration structures, i.e. cycles of direct and indirect
reciprocity have not yet established. After that, 〈x〉 constantly increases because these structures
gradually improve by better integrating agents. But if all agents reach a high performance, the
extremal dynamics will eventually destroy such structures because it removes agents from existing
cylces. This eventually leads to crashes in the system performance which are followed by new
stages of recovery. This way, the system never reaches an equilibrium.
An extension of the extremal dynamics explicitly considers that entry and exit involve more
than one agent. Instead of choosing randomly one of the agents with lowest performance, one
can consider to remove a fraction of least performing agents [49] and compensate this with the
entry of many more new agents. This implies to define a threshold for the performance, which
interestingly has a nontrivial impact on the overall stability of the system. Small threshold values
are able to improve the stability by reducing the number of crashes over time [49].
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Figure 11: (a) Evolution of the average knowledge stock at time scale T , involving network
disruptions [53]. (b,c) Different nonlinearities in Eqn. (38) combined with different mechanisms
for link deletion and creation result in different network structures: (b) Extremal dynamics, no
externalities. (c) Random unilateral link creation, optimal unilateral link deletion, externalities
νext give higher weights to links contributing to cycles, this way fostering indirect reciprocity.
[25]
5.2 Linear growth of knowledge stock: Rational decisions
The simplified entry and exit dynamics described above does not involve any decisions of agents,
because they are replaced by stochastic perturbations of the system. In socio-economic systems,
however, agents make decisions about creating or deleting links to other agents, based on their
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utility. This considers the benefits and costs of interactions. To calculate these, agents need
information, e.g. about the knowledge stock of their collaborators, which is not always fully
available. Therefore, decisions are based on bounded rationality, i.e. in the absence of information
also random decisions about link creation or deletion govern the dynamics. In our case, the
benefits of interactions are clearly given by the growth of the own knowledge stock, whereas the
costs result from maintaining collaborations with other agents. The latter should be proportional
to the number of links an agent has. But here we have to consider that agents maintain outgoing
links, i.e. links that contribute to the knowledge growth of other agents, whereas benefits depend
on incoming links from other agents (which are not necessarily the same).
This precisely describes the dilemma: why should agents maintain links if they do not see a
direct benefit from this? Reciprocity would be the appropriate argument for this, but only di-
rect reciprocity can be easily observed by an agent. To detect indirect reciprocity would require
knowledge about the interaction structure in the broader neighborhood, in case of larger cy-
cles even knowledge about the full system. This becomes increasingly unrealistic. Yet, system
wide collaboration structures are empirically observed, and indirect reciprocity is an established
mechanism is many social systems.
Agent-based models allow to study the conditions under which such collaboration structures
emerge despite individual utility considerations would stand against them. We define the utility
of agent i as
ui(t) = Bi[A,x(t)]− Ci[A,x(t)] (39)
x(t) is the vector of knowledge stock values xi(t) of all agents and A is the adjacency matrix
that describes the current interaction structure. Both benefits Bi and costs Ci depend on these,
as follows. Benefits are assumed to be proportional to the growth of knowledge stock, i.e. Bi(t) ∝
x˙i(t)/xi(t) [22–24]. The dynamics of the knowledge stock is described by Eqn. (38), but here we
drop the last two terms, i.e. we neglect saturation (κ = 0) and externalities (νext = 0), making
this a linear dynamics in x. One can then prove [22] that limt→∞ x˙i(t)/xi(t) = λPF(Gi), where
λPF(Gi) is a property of the adjacency matrix A, precisely the largest real eigenvalue, also known
as Perron-Frobenius (PF) eigenvalue, of the connected component Gi agent i is part of.
For the costs Ci we consider that all outgoing links have to be maintained at a cost c, i.e.
Ci = c
∑
j lij = c k
out
i , where k
out
i is the out-degree of agent i. This leads to the following
expression for the agent utility:
ui(t) =
x˙i(t)
xi(t)
− c kouti ⇒ ui(T ) = lim
t→∞ui(t) = λ
PF(Gi)− c kouti (40)
We still have to define how agents make use of the information derived from their utility, to
decide about link formation and link deletion. We posit that these decisions are driven by utility
maximization. If a pair (i, j) of agents is selected at random, then a link (i, j) /∈ E(G), that
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is not part of the set of links, E, of the network G is created if the link (i, j) increases either
ui(T ) or uj(T ) (or both) and none decreases. This selection scheme is known as incremental
improvement. As an alternative, one could also consider a random unilateral link creation, i.e. a
link to a randomly chosen agent j is already created if only ui(T ) increases.
Further, if a pair (i, j) of agents is selected at random, then an existing link (i, j) ∈ E(G) is
deleted if at least one of the two agents increases its utility from removing this link. This is known
as optimal unilateral link deletion. An alternative could be the optimal bilateral link deletion,
which considers both agents similar to the incremental improvement scheme.
Applications. There are different ways to extent this model. First, one could consider al-
ternatives for calculating the utilities, e.g. by modifying the information taken into account for
the calculation, or by including nonlinear terms to reflect saturation effects, etc. Second, one
may consider alternatives for calculating the decisions made on these utilities. Incremental Im-
provement just picks the first randomly selected pair of agents with a positive utility increase
to create a link. A different scheme would be best response. It creates the link only between the
pair of agents that will give the highest increase of utility. This would require (i) to have access
to all agents and to have full information about their knowledge stocks, and (ii) to postpone
decisions until all possible pairs have been considered. It can be shown that such a scenario, even
with more information, not necessarily leads to a better outcome regarding the collaboration
structure. Because of path dependent decision processes, the agent population can get trapped
in suboptimal system states [22].
A realistic modification is to consider that link deletion involves a severance cost [23]. I.e. agents
that have invested in establishing a collaboration will loose part of this investment when they
decide to cancel the collaboration. If these additional costs become high, agents will be more
reluctant to change their collaboration structure. Again, the system can then be trapped in
suboptimal states.
6 Conclusions
As we have demonstrated, the law of proportionate growth is a very versatile dynamics, in
particular when combined with additional dynamic assumptions. The core dynamics simply states
that the growth of a quantity xi, i.e. dxi/dt, is proportional to xi. The formal solution of this
basic dynamics is exponential growth or exponential decay, dependent on the proportionality
constant. It has been observed that such a dynamics with suitable modifications can explain a
larger range of empirical phenomena observed in socio-economic systems. Notably, the “law of
proportionate growth” was first related to the observed size distribution of firms by R. Gibrat
in 1931 [56].
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Distributions refer to systemic (or “macroscopic”) properties, while the underlying dynamics is
proposed for the (“microscopic”) system elements, or agents. Hence, such agent-based models
are capable of establishing the micro-macro link, if they can explain the emergence of systemic
properties from the interaction of the system elements. Already the application by Gibrat illus-
trates that it needs additional assumptions to make this happen. It is not simply the exponential
growth that reproduces the firm size distribution. It further needs specific assumptions about the
proportionality factor – its underlying normal distribution, non-stationarity and randomness –
that only allows to obtain the correct systemic property. Hence, what constitutes the essence of
the particular phenomenon can be understood from the deviations from the simple exponential
dynamics. And these “deviations” are in fact the ingredients that make a particular dynamic
model an economic or a social one. They often allow for an interpretation in a socio-economic
context, as Gibrat’s example witnesses.
The various applications discussed in this paper illustrate that in agent-based models the law of
proportionate growth often acts at two different levels: First, there is the growth (or the decay)
dxi/dt proportional to the own quantity xi(t), with the growth of firm sizes or individual wealth
as typical examples. Second, there is additionally the growth dxi/dt proportional to the quantities
xj(t) of other agents, with the dynamics of opinions, reputation, or knowledge stock as examples.
The latter requires interactions between agents, for which different forms have been discussed.
There are direct interactions between any two agents, as in the example of battling. There are
interactions restricted by the existence of links, as in the case of networks, or thresholds, as in
the bounded confidence model. Eventually, there are also indirect interactions resulting from
the coupling to aggregated variables, for example in the wealth redistribution model or in the
wisdom of crowds.
The versatility of the agent-based models discussed also results from the combination of differ-
ent deterministic and stochastic growth assumptions. There are random proportionality factors
drawn from different distributions that determine whether individual agents experience growth
or decay in the long run. Examples are the growth of firm sizes or of individual wealth. There are
deterministic proportionality factors, which can be either positive or negative, constant or time
dependent. Examples are saturated growth, the decay of reputation or knowledge stock. Even
more, these assumptions about growth factors can be combined in an additive or a multiplicative
manner. This was illustrated in the simple investment model and in the wealth redistribution
model, which both combine multiplicative and additive growth.
Despite the richness of the models that result from combining such assumptions, we still have
to remark their simplicity and accessibility. As demonstrated, in many cases we are able to
formally analyze such models, to derive insights about systemic properties and critical parameter
constellations. This is in fact one of the main reasons to base our agent-based models on the law
of proportionate growth as the core dynamics. Constructing models this way allows us to derive
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expectations about the collective dynamics, and often to generate hypotheses, while agent-based
simulations illustrate the dynamics from an individual perspective.
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